CVE-2022-41636 highlights a significant security concern in the industrial manufacturing sector. Manufacturers using the popular Haas Controller (specifically version 100.20.000.111) should be alerted to this exploit. In essence, all data transmission involving the "Ethernet Q Commands" service travels over the network in clear, human-readable text. That means passwords, job instructions, and even proprietary machine operations can be intercepted and viewed by any attacker lurking on the same network.

This post aims to break down what this vulnerability means, show sample code to sniff traffic, and provide advice to protect against it.

What is "Ethernet Q Commands"?

Haas Automation is a major producer of CNC (Computer Numerical Control) machines. Its controllers, like the one targeted here, support automation via protocols such as "Ethernet Q Commands," which lets software communicate with machine tools for operations like job starts, queries, and diagnostics.

But here's the issue

> "Ethernet Q Command" packets are sent in plain text, unencrypted over the network.

Why Is This a Problem?

When data is transmitted in cleartext, anyone with access to your network can intercept it! Attackers can easily:

Harvest usernames, passwords, job data

This risk is especially high in factories and workshops where security controls might be weaker or multiple parties share the same network.

Quick Glance: The Vulnerable Service

> Vulnerability: Traffic between client software and the Haas controller’s Ethernet Q Command TCP service is sent without encryption or authentication.  
>
> Impact: Attackers can see all data; they may also modify and resend commands (if additional protections are missing).  
>
> Affected Version: Haas Controller 100.20.000.111 (and possibly others).  
>
> CVSS: 5.9 (Medium) per NVD

Example: Capturing Cleartext Q Command Traffic

Below is a basic Python script using Scapy to sniff Q Command traffic between a control PC and a Haas controller on the local subnet.

from scapy.all import sniff, Raw, TCP

def packet_callback(packet):
    if packet.haslayer(TCP):
        # Assume default port 8081 for "Ethernet Q Commands" unless otherwise set
        if packet[TCP].dport == 8081 or packet[TCP].sport == 8081:
            if packet.haslayer(Raw):
                # Print the clear payload; try decoding for readable text
                print("Captured Q Command Traffic:")
                print(packet[Raw].load.decode('utf-8', errors='ignore'))

sniff(filter="tcp port 8081", prn=packet_callback, store=)


> Note: Replace 8081 with the port actually configured on your Haas system.

References & Technical Details

- CVE Detail: CVE-2022-41636
- Haas Automation Product Info (Official Haas page for the controller version)
- IoT/OT Advisories: Advisories — Haas Controller (Official ICS advisories, search for "Haas")

Exploit Scenario: How an Attacker Steals Secrets

Imagine a disgruntled employee or an attacker on your Wi-Fi setting up a laptop to "listen" for TCP traffic on the Q Commands port. Within seconds, they gather:

- Operator usernames/passwords typed over the protocol

3. Restrict who can plug into your manufacturing LAN. Employ network access control.

- 4. Monitor for unusual traffic to your controller. Use intrusion detection systems when possible.

Disclosure and Fixes

According to reports, as of mid-2023, this traffic was still unencrypted out-of-the-box for affected versions. If you own a Haas controller, check with Haas support for updates or patches. Meanwhile, implement the network restrictions above.

Conclusion

Cleartext protocols in industrial settings are an open invitation for IP theft and disruption. If you use the Haas Controller, assume any Ethernet Q Command traffic is readable by anyone on your network and secure or segment accordingly.

Stay safe, segment your networks, and push vendors for better OT/IOT security!

*This post is exclusive analysis. For more technical advisories, visit nvd.nist.gov or your local CERT.*

Timeline

Published on: 10/28/2022 18:15:00 UTC
Last modified on: 11/01/2022 20:27:00 UTC