Security vulnerabilities deep in the system framework layer often remain hidden from plain sight until researchers dig them up. One such risk is CVE-2022-44562, which involves a mismatch between serialization and deserialization logic. While this may sound technical, the core problem is straightforward: when data is saved (“serialized”) and later read back (“deserialized”) by system components, errors during this process can let attackers bypass security boundaries. Here’s how this bug works, why it matters, and how it can be attacked.

First, a quick primer

- Serialization is the process of turning data or objects into a format (like a byte array or string) that can be stored or sent somewhere.

Deserialization is the process of turning that data back into an object.

Systems often use these processes to transfer information between applications or to save state data. But if someone changes the serialized data, and the code that deserializes it doesn’t properly check its contents, bad things can happen.

The Vulnerability: What Is CVE-2022-44562?

CVE-2022-44562 affects the _system framework layer_ (most commonly seen in platforms like Android, but principles apply widely), specifically when certain framework components assume too much about the safety of serialized data they receive. Here’s the summary:

- Problem: The framework trusts serialized data received from other components or apps. Due to differences between the serialization and deserialization logic, an attacker can craft malicious serialized data that—when deserialized—leads to the execution of unintended code, or assignment of elevated permissions.
- Impact: Privilege escalation—an attacker’s code runs with more permissions than intended, which could mean reading personal data, changing settings, or executing admin-level tasks.

References

- NVD - CVE-2022-44562
- Exploit Database Info *(example, replace with correct)*

Exploit Walkthrough (With Code Snippet)

Let's see a simplified example. Suppose a sensitive framework service serializes permission objects.

Vulnerable Framework Code (Simplified)

// Serialization
public void writeObject(ObjectOutputStream out) throws IOException {
    out.writeObject(this.username);
    out.writeObject(this.permission);
}

// Deserialization
public void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
    this.username = (String) in.readObject();
    this.permission = (String) in.readObject();
    // No check on the contents of permission
}

Here, if the attacker can send their own serialized object (like over IPC or a file), they might set permission to "admin" while normal apps never could.

Malicious Payload Construction (In Python using pickle)

import pickle

class ExploitPayload:
    def __init__(self):
        self.username = "attacker"
        self.permission = "admin"  # Or any privileged flag
payload = ExploitPayload()
with open("attack_payload.pkl", "wb") as f:
    pickle.dump(payload, f)


*(Note: The real exploitation will depend on the framework's actual protocol, this shows the idea.)*

When this payload is deserialized by the vulnerable framework code, the attacker is suddenly 'admin'.

How Attackers Use This for Privilege Escalation

1. Send Malicious Data: Attacker crafts a serialized payload where critical fields are set to privileged values.
2. Trigger Deserialization: The payload is delivered to the vulnerable service (for example, via an IPC message, saved file, or other communication channel).
3. Bypass Checks: Because the framework’s deserialization code doesn’t verify the origin or contents of each field, the attacker’s values are accepted.
4. Gain Extra Privileges: The attacker’s code now runs with higher permissions—reading files, changing settings, or executing other attacks.

Why Is This So Dangerous?

- Depth: This flaw lies in the _system layer_, beneath most app-level security measures. Once exploited, it breaks the trust model.
- Reusability: If the framework code for permissions can be tricked, any number of sensitive workflows can be targeted.
- Simplicity: No need for buffer overflows or memory corruption—just a carefully crafted data blob.

Never trust input: After deserialization, always verify field values and validate permissions.

- Avoid native deserialization of untrusted data: Use safer serialization formats (like JSON), or frameworks with built-in type checks.

Conclusion

CVE-2022-44562 proves that, even without crashing a system or breaking cryptography, subtle mistakes with data handling can hand attackers the keys. This vulnerability is a reminder to never take data at face value—especially inside the system framework. For further reading, see NVD - CVE-2022-44562 and always keep your systems up-to-date.

Further Reading

- Deserialization Vulnerabilities Cheat Sheet
- Android Security Bulletins

Timeline

Published on: 11/09/2022 21:15:00 UTC
Last modified on: 11/10/2022 19:09:00 UTC