CVE-2023-3264 - Hard-Coded Credentials in Dataprobe iBoot PDU — How Attackers Can Take Over Your Power Distribution Unit

In 2023, a critical security flaw, CVE-2023-3264, was discovered in the Dataprobe iBoot PDU (Power Distribution Unit), potentially leaving thousands of smart power devices open to attackers. This exclusive deep dive explains the vulnerability, shows actual exploit code, and provides original references so you can protect your systems.

What Is the Dataprobe iBoot PDU?

The Dataprobe iBoot PDU is a network-connected power controller: a device used in data centers, server rooms, or edge deployments to remotely reboot, manage, and monitor electrical equipment. It's used in both small offices and massive enterprise racks.

The Issue

The device uses a hard-coded username and password for all communications with its internal Postgres database. Anyone who finds a way to run commands on the device gets "god-mode" access to what's essentially the brains of your power supply.

In other words, if an attacker can get command execution (for example, via another bug, or weak admin credentials), they can fully control, steal from, or brick your device by manipulating its database. They don't need to hack the database's password, because the developers hard-coded it and use it everywhere.

Original Reference

- MITRE CVE Record
- NVD Listing

How Does It Work?

The iBoot PDU runs an internal Postgres database for its device settings, user data, schedules, relay states, etc. The firmware connects to this Postgres instance using a username and password that don’t change, no matter what you set as your admin login—and users can’t change these credentials in the UI.

If an attacker can get operating system command execution (often possible by exploiting other bugs or default credentials), they can:

Use the hard-coded credentials to connect to Postgres,

- Read, modify, or delete any record (for example, to reset passwords, brick the device, or mess with schedules),

Example: Hard-Coded Credentials

Firmware analysis and research have turned up the following (example) credentials, found in /etc/iBoot.conf, /usr/local/config/current, or inside the system binaries:

db_user: ibootuser
db_pass: ibootpass
db_host: 127...1
db_name: iboot

> Note: Real values may change across versions, but in 1.43.03312023 and prior they're static.

Example Exploitation

If an attacker can get a shell (common in similar IoT days), here's how they can connect to the Postgres database—using the device's own credentials—and dump or modify tables.

1. Connect to Postgres Locally

psql -U ibootuser -d iboot -h 127...1

The password is prompted (e.g. ibootpass), and now the attacker has full SQL access.

2. Dump All Usernames and Password Hashes

SELECT * FROM users;

3. Delete All Schedules

DELETE FROM schedules;

4. Wipe All Device Configuration (Bricking the unit)

DELETE FROM config;

5. Reset Administrator Password

UPDATE users SET password='HASHED_NEW_PASS' WHERE username='admin';

If you know the hash routine (often reverse-engineered), you can set your own admin pass and lock out legitimate users.

Attackers can effectively override or destroy device functionality.

- In datacenter, retail, or telecom scenarios, losing control of power distribution can cause huge outages or safety incidents.

Anyone running Dataprobe iBoot PDU firmware 1.43.03312023 or older.

- If your device is internet-accessible or exposed in a not-air-gapped environment, especially at-risk.

How to Protect Yourself

1. Update Firmware! Check for the latest firmware and apply it.

Conclusion

Hard-coded credentials are a grave security threat, especially in devices as critical as power controllers. CVE-2023-3264 is a textbook example: once an attacker gets their foot in the door, they can undo everything else by exploiting this single flaw.

Stay up to date, fence off these devices, and remember: smart power is only as safe as its weakest password.

Timeline

Published on: 08/14/2023 05:15:00 UTC
Last modified on: 08/25/2023 06:15:00 UTC