CVE-2024-25832 - Unrestricted File Upload in F-logic DataCube3 v1. Explained

In early 2024, a new vulnerability was discovered in F-logic DataCube3 v1.—a data analysis and visualization web application. Tracked as CVE-2024-25832, this flaw allows an authenticated user to upload files with dangerous extensions, potentially enabling server-side code execution. In simple terms, an attacker logged into the DataCube3 system can upload files that the system should have blocked, like PHP scripts, by tricking how files are named.

In this post, we'll break down what this vulnerability is, how it works, see code snippets showing the problem, look at possible exploit scenarios, and link out to original references for further reading.

What is Unrestricted File Upload?

Unrestricted file upload vulnerabilities happen when a website lets users upload any type of file without properly checking what the file is or restricting dangerous types. This can allow attackers to upload scripts or executables that, when opened or run by the server, can give the attacker control over the site.

F-logic DataCube3 v1.: The Vulnerability

In DataCube3 v1., the server has a feature to upload files for data processing. The vulnerability with CVE-2024-25832 is that the server does not correctly check the file's extension after the user uploads it, allowing a malicious file to be uploaded by tweaking its filename to sneak past checks.

Example scenario:
An attacker uploads a file named shell.php.jpg. Normally the application might only look at the .jpg part and allow the file through, but the server later treats the file as PHP if it lands in the right directory, allowing code execution.

Let's look at a simple (pseudo) PHP code block that demonstrates this problem

$allowed_types = array('jpg', 'png', 'csv');

$filename = $_FILES['user_file']['name'];
$ext = strtolower(pathinfo($filename, PATHINFO_EXTENSION));

if (in_array($ext, $allowed_types)) {
    // Move the uploaded file to destination
    move_uploaded_file($_FILES['user_file']['tmp_name'], "/uploads/" . $filename);
    echo "File uploaded!";
} else {
    echo "File type not allowed.";
}

If an attacker uploads malicious.php.jpg, $ext is .jpg, but the file is actually a PHP script.

- If the server is wrongly configured and runs PHP in the uploads folder, accessing /uploads/malicious.php.jpg as /uploads/malicious.php (via URL rewrite or other means) can execute the attacker's code.

Upload File: Use the upload feature to send this file to the server.

5. Access Malicious File: If the server exposes the uploads directory and processes PHP, attacker visits:

`

http://target-site.com/uploads/shell.php.jpg?cmd=ls

Example Secure Code (PHP)

// Generate unique file name
$new_filename = uniqid() . ".jpg";
move_uploaded_file($_FILES['user_file']['tmp_name'], "/uploads/" . $new_filename);

References

- NVD Entry for CVE-2024-25832
- OWASP File Upload Cheatsheet
- Exploit Database Reference
- F-logic DataCube3 Project

Conclusion

CVE-2024-25832 shows just how dangerous weak file upload handling can be, even for authenticated-only portals. It’s a reminder to always double-check how your apps accept, store, and process files—never trust the filename or file type sent by users! For DataCube3 users, the best move is to patch fast and audit all uploads.

If you use or manage F-logic DataCube3, check your version and update it as soon as a fix is available.

Timeline

Published on: 02/29/2024 01:44:16 UTC
Last modified on: 01/16/2025 17:50:36 UTC