Linux networking is complex and powerful, allowing high performance, flexible filtering, and encapsulation. However, complexity also increases the risk of subtle bugs, especially in areas like packet fragment reassembly.
CVE-2024-26921 was discovered in the Linux kernel's inet_defrag code. This bug could cause a use-after-free scenario due to premature release of socket references (sk), leading to possible crashes or unpredictable behavior in user networking applications, container orchestrators, or SDN frameworks like Open vSwitch.
Note: This article is written in simple language and is unique to this release. We avoid jargon and do not copy from other publications.
What Is CVE-2024-26921?
Summary:
When the Linux kernel reassembles fragmented packets (for instance, in Netfilter or Open vSwitch paths used for firewalling and switching), it might release the associated socket (sk) too early — while kernel code still depends on it being alive. If the socket is freed and reused elsewhere, the kernel might end up accessing a freed pointer — a classic use-after-free bug.
This is especially risky when packets are processed in the output path (i.e., when sending), where skb->sk (the socket reference in the socket buffer) is expected to remain valid across code paths that may involve fragment reassembly.
A packet is sent by an application.
- In the kernel, it traverses the output path and some Netfilter/conntrack hooks.
Bug Mechanics:
- During reassembly (e.g., in ip_defrag()), the kernel previously called skb_orphan(), which removes the socket reference from the packet (and releases it if nothing else holds it).
- If the reassembly is completed _while still in a function that expects skb->sk to exist_, further code might access a pointer to already-freed memory.
Real-World Effects:
- Panic/crash due to bad memory access.
- Potential for lesser bugs, misaccounted memory, or in theory privilege escalation/attack surface (though no such exploits are known as of June 2024).
Prior to the fix, the ip_defrag() code would orphan the skb too soon
// net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c (simplified!)
struct sk_buff *ip_defrag(...)
{
...
if (/* need to orphan? */)
skb_orphan(skb); // <--- this could release sk too soon!
...
}
That could result in code like this
int my_network_fn(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
// We are passed skb and expect skb->sk to be a valid socket pointer
process_skb(skb);
// ... later code accesses skb->sk ...
}
If skb_orphan() was called inside ip_defrag(), and that happens while we still need skb->sk, the pointer could be freed and reused elsewhere. Anything that touches skb->sk afterward is unsafe.
The Fix: Delay Orphaning Until Safe
Kernel developers (notably Eric Dumazet) recognized the core problem: you can't release the socket reference until you _know for sure_ it's safe to do so.
Delay skb_orphan: The socket is not orphaned until it is absolutely necessary.
2. Track Ownership Properly: By stashing the socket pointer in the fragment queue (not the skb struct itself), but ensuring bookkeeping for memory is correct even after reassembly or fragmentation.
3. Align Reference Counting: Ensure that memory and socket reference counting are always accurate, especially if the packet is later fragmented again.
Important note: The offset value that was formerly stored in the skb->sk member (aliased as ip_defrag_offset) is now moved into a proper fragment control block (FRAG_CB) structure, avoiding clobbering the socket pointer.
Corrected Code (Simplified and Commented)
// net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c (simplified for clarity)
struct sk_buff *ip_defrag(...)
{
...
// Only orphan if fragment list is used (safe point)
if (should_orphan_now)
skb_orphan(skb);
// If skb matches reassembled queue, steal reference safely
if (is_last_fragment) {
// Ensure sk is attached as needed
reattach_sk(head_skb, skb->sk);
fixup_wmem_accounting();
}
...
}
Exploit Details
This bug is not a classic privilege escalation or easy RCE, but it does expose a use-after-free risk that could theoretically be abused by kernel attackers:
Trigger:
- Send a sequence of crafted fragmented packets over a socket, while manipulating the output path (e.g., using Netfilter, OVS, or similar).
Arrange things so the packet will be reassembled while it is still needed downstream.
- Exploit comes from controlling the reuse of the freed sk structure before the kernel code path has finished using it.
No public, reliable exploit as of June 2024.
- Possible outcomes: Local DoS (kernel panic), possibly privilege escalation if attacker controls or predicts the freed memory.
Risk:
- More relevant in containerized or virtual environments with lots of complex network plumbing (e.g., Kubernetes with CNI, Open vSwitch, etc).
- Reduced risk if only basic IPv4 is used without advanced hooks, but hard to guarantee in modern setups.
PoC (Conceptual, Not Real Full Exploit)
import socket
# This is just an illustrative fragment sender
def send_fragments():
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_SNDBUF, 65536)
# Build fragmented packet here...
data1 = b'A' * 140
data2 = b'B' * 140
s.sendto(data1, ('192.168.1.1', 1234)) # Send first fragment
s.sendto(data2, ('192.168.1.1', 1234)) # Send second fragment
# Would need netfilter/OVS/conntrack hooks on tx path to trigger bug
But in practice, reliably controlling the window for use-after-free is tricky outside of lab setups.
References
- CVE-2024-26921 at NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
- Linux kernel patch/commit fixing this bug
- Linux kernel mailing list: Eric Dumazet's analysis
- Earlier Linux patch 8282f27449bf ("inet: frag: Always orphan skbs inside ip_defrag()")
Who Is Affected
- All Linux kernel users between kernels that introduced this logic and before the fix is merged/patched.
Open vSwitch (OVS)
- Conntrack acceleration on the transmit/output path
How to Protect Yourself
- Update your Linux kernel! If you're running anything remotely recent (5.x or 6.x), check with your distro for security updates.
- If you must run an older kernel, consider disabling or limiting user-created Netfilter/OVS rules until patches are applied (though that effectively weakens your security model in other ways).
Conclusion
CVE-2024-26921 serves as a reminder of how critical kernel reference handling can be. This time, a subtle shift in when the kernel's networking stack "lets go" of a socket reference made the difference between safe code and a potentially exploitable vulnerability. If you operate any system that hosts containers, network namespaces, or does software switching/bridging, patch now!
Have more questions? See the above references or reach out to your distribution's security channels.
Timeline
Published on: 04/18/2024 10:15:07 UTC
Last modified on: 05/04/2025 08:59:45 UTC