In 2024, a significant vulnerability surfaced in the Undertow web server, tracked as CVE-2024-7885. The issue lies in how the ProxyProtocolReadListener class manages a StringBuilder object when parsing incoming HTTP requests. If not patched, this can potentially lead to information leakage across different HTTP requests — a nightmare scenario for multi-user or high-security deployments.
This article gives you a clear, step-by-step look at CVE-2024-7885, including technical details, sample code, and practical exploitation scenarios. The aim is to make the vulnerability simple to understand, even if you’re not a security expert or Java wizard.
What Is Undertow?
Undertow is a lightweight Java web server known for its flexibility and performance. It’s used in many enterprise environments, directly or within frameworks like WildFly and JBoss EAP.
Type: Information Disclosure
- Severity: Medium (leakage mostly, but sometimes fatal error/connection drop)
ROOT CAUSE
The bug occurs because the method that parses requests, *parseProxyProtocolV1*, reuses the same StringBuilder instance for multiple requests on the same HTTP connection. In Java, a StringBuilder is mutable: if it isn’t properly emptied after each use, data from an old request can stick around and accidentally get included in a new one.
Vulnerable Pseudocode
// Simplified: ProxyProtocolReadListener.java
public class ProxyProtocolReadListener {
private StringBuilder buffer = new StringBuilder();
private void parseProxyProtocolV1(ByteBuffer input) {
// Appends new data to buffer
while (input.hasRemaining()) {
char c = (char) input.get();
buffer.append(c);
// ... process each char until end of proxy line
}
// Suppose parsing finishes, but buffer isn't reset:
String header = buffer.toString();
// header now might include leftover data from a previous request!
}
}
If a new HTTP request comes in on the same connection, the buffer may *already contain extra data* from the previous one! This can:
Exploit Scenario — Step by Step
Environment: An Undertow server with proxy protocol enabled, with multiple clients making requests via the same HTTP connection (e.g., HTTP/1.1 keep-alive, or using a reverse proxy/balancer upstream).
Some old data from Client A gets mixed up.
#### 3. Client B (or application/business logic) receives data that may contain traces of Client A’s request.
First Request (Client A)
PROXY TCP4 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.1 12345 80\r\nGET /test1 HTTP/1.1\r\n
Second Request (Client B)
PROXY TCP4 10.10.10.10 10.10.10.1 54321 808\r\nGET /test2 HTTP/1.1\r\n
But due to the bug, the buffer contains
PROXY TCP4 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.1 12345 80
PROXY TCP4 10.10.10.10 10.10.10.1 54321 808
Now, data meant only for Client A leaks to Client B.
Proof-of-Concept Code
The following snippet simulates what happens if the buffer isn’t cleared. (Don’t use in production!)
public class SimplePPV1Demo {
private static StringBuilder buffer = new StringBuilder();
// Simulate two proxy requests arriving on same connection
public static void main(String[] args) {
// Client A
String proxyLineA = "PROXY TCP4 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.1 12345 80\r\n";
parseProxyProtocolV1(proxyLineA);
// Client B (same buffer, not cleared)
String proxyLineB = "PROXY TCP4 10.10.10.10 10.10.10.1 54321 808\r\n";
parseProxyProtocolV1(proxyLineB);
}
private static void parseProxyProtocolV1(String line) {
buffer.append(line);
String header = buffer.toString();
System.out.println("Header parsed: " + header);
// Oops, buffer must be cleared here!
// buffer.setLength(); // <== missing in vulnerable code
}
}
Output
Header parsed: PROXY TCP4 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.1 12345 80
Header parsed: PROXY TCP4 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.1 12345 80
PROXY TCP4 10.10.10.10 10.10.10.1 54321 808
You use Undertow with the proxy protocol feature.
- Your server handles multiple HTTP requests per connection (common with HTTP keep-alive, or behind load balancers).
What’s The Risk?
This bug usually causes outright parsing errors and closes the connection — but sometimes, old data can wrongly cross over between requests. This is especially risky on:
Applications with sensitive headers or session data in the proxy protocol lines.
Bottom Line: If a malicious client guesses the timing, they could steal another user’s proxy line or metadata.
Patch Status & Fix
Upstream fix: Developers patched this by resetting the buffer (buffer.setLength()) after every parse, ensuring no ghost data is carried over.
Reference
- Undertow GitHub Issue #1509
- Red Hat Security Advisory
Upgrade to Undertow version: Any version with the buffer-reset fix — check for the latest releases on Undertow Releases.
Patch immediately: Update Undertow to the latest release if you use the proxy protocol feature.
- If you can’t patch: Disable the proxy protocol feature, or use isolation controls to ensure only trusted connections.
Closing Thoughts
CVE-2024-7885 is a prime example of how a small programming mistake — like not clearing a buffer — can turn into a real-world risk for web security. If you run Java web apps that rely on Undertow and the proxy protocol, don’t wait — apply the patch today.
Further Reading
- Undertow Official Site
- CVE-2024-7885 Details on NVD (coming soon)
- The Proxy Protocol Explained
For more hands-on security tips and Java vulnerability coverage, stay tuned!
Timeline
Published on: 08/21/2024 14:15:09 UTC
Last modified on: 08/29/2024 18:18:13 UTC