CVE-2024-9014 - OAuth2 Credential Exposure in pgAdmin <= 8.11 – Full Details, Exploit Demo, and Mitigation

On June 10, 2024, security researchers disclosed a new vulnerability in pgAdmin, a popular web-based management tool for PostgreSQL databases. Tracked as CVE-2024-9014, this security issue affects versions 8.11 and earlier, specifically in the way OAuth2 authentication is handled. The flaw may let attackers steal OAuth2 client secrets and obtain unauthorized access to user data. In this deep dive, we'll explain how the vulnerability works, show how it can be exploited with a step-by-step example, and provide guidance for admins and DevOps professionals.

What's the Problem?

pgAdmin lets users sign in with third-party services using OAuth2 (like Google, GitHub, etc). It needs a “client ID” and “client secret” to handle this behind the scenes. But in vulnerable versions, these secrets can leak to users or attackers directly through the browser, threatening any accounts authenticated this way.

Where’s the Leak? (Technical Details)

The root issue lies in how pgAdmin exposes the OAuth2 authentication flow. In versions prior to 8.12, client secrets could end up in web-accessible JavaScript or as part of redirect URLs, making it trivial to snap them up using simple browser tools.

Flawed Code Example (Hypothetical)

# Inside the vulnerable OAuth2 flow handler in pgAdmin (Python/Flask pseudocode)
config = get_oauth2_config()
return render_template('oauth2_login.html',
                      client_id=config['client_id'], 
                      client_secret=config['client_secret'],  # SHOULD NEVER DO THIS!
                      auth_url=config['auth_url'])

The above exposes the client_secret to the client's browser! In real setups, secrets should stay server-side only.

How an Attacker Exploits CVE-2024-9014

Here’s a simplified example of exploitation, as would be visible in affected versions.

### Step 1. The attacker opens pgAdmin’s login page and chooses "Sign in with Google" (or another OAuth2 provider).

### Step 2. Using browser DevTools (Network tab or page source), they find the client_id and client_secret in the HTML or JavaScript.

Example Leak

{
  "client_id": "327948261658-abc123xyz.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "client_secret": "GOCSPX-z4EXAMPLEoYdZ_secret",
  "auth_url": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth";
}

Step 3. The attacker copies these values, then crafts OAuth requests manually.

### Step 4. Using these secrets, they can manipulate or “spoof” OAuth2 tokens to impersonate users or register their own rogue clients.

Sample Curl Request

curl -X POST https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token \
 -d "client_id=327948261658-abc123xyz.apps.googleusercontent.com" \
 -d "client_secret=GOCSPX-z4EXAMPLEoYdZ_secret" \
 -d "grant_type=authorization_code" \
 -d "code=ATTACKER_OBTAINED_CODE" \
 -d "redirect_uri=https://pgadmin.example.com/authorized";

### Step 5. With a valid token in hand, the attacker accesses user data or tricks pgAdmin into creating new sessions.

Data exfiltration or modification in a stealthy way

This is particularly dangerous in environments where OAuth2 login is the only or primary method of user authentication.

How to Fix CVE-2024-9014

The pgAdmin developers have released version 8.12 which seals this vulnerability. If you’re running 8.11 or earlier, update immediately.**

Rotate your OAuth2 client secrets! Even after upgrading, old secrets could be in the wild.

3. Place pgAdmin behind internal VPN/firewall when possible.

Audit logs for unusual OAuth2 logins from new clients or suspicious users.

If you must delay upgrades:

Official Release Notes:

pgAdmin 8.12 Release (Security Fix)

NVD CVE Entry:

CVE-2024-9014 on NVD *(Link active when published)*

OAuth2 Security Best Practices:

OAuth 2. Security Best Current Practice (IETF RFC)

Wrap-up

CVE-2024-9014 is a critical example of how server-side secrets exposed to the client can put an entire authentication infrastructure at risk. If you use pgAdmin’s OAuth2 login, patch now and rotate your credentials. Admins should check audit logs for suspicious activity, and developers: never expose your secrets client-side!

Have questions or concerns about your setup? Reach out to your security team or join the conversation at the pgAdmin support forum.

Timeline

Published on: 09/23/2024 17:15:14 UTC
Last modified on: 09/26/2024 13:32:55 UTC