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Overview

A newly disclosed security vulnerability, CVE-2025-22422, highlights a logic error affecting how authentication prompts are handled in some Android apps. This bug can allow an app to trick users into unknowingly granting permissions or approvals—allowing one app to misuse authentication results designed for another application. Unlike many privilege escalation attacks, this one does not require user interaction: as long as a vulnerable authentication flow exists, the attacker only needs to craft the right request.

This long read unpacks what CVE-2025-22422 is, how it works under the hood with code examples, how an exploit might look, and where to find references and mitigations.

What is CVE-2025-22422?

In multiple locations in various Android projects, there's a logic error when handling authentication requests. Specifically, the system or a component requests an authentication prompt for a given app (let's say App A), but another app (App B) can use the result of that prompt—bypassing checks about where the prompt originated.

The user thinks they're authenticating for App A

- Their authentication result is used by App B (or malicious code), potentially leading to local privilege escalation without needing escalation of execution privileges or additional user interaction.

> In short: Authentication prompts can be hijacked through logic flaws, and privilege boundaries can be crossed in local app interactions.

Let's walk through a simplified sequence

1. App B (malicious or compromised) initiates an authentication prompt that 'looks' like it's for App A.
2. The user (optionally) authenticates, or in some flows, the prompt is handled automatically without any input.

Below is an example structure (simplified for clarity—exact implementation varies by framework)

// App B's malicious component
Intent authIntent = new Intent("com.example.appa.AUTHENTICATE");
authIntent.putExtra("request_code", 12345);
// App B sets itself as a receiver for the authentication result
PendingIntent pendingIntent = PendingIntent.getBroadcast(context, , new Intent("com.example.appb.EXPLOIT_RECEIVER"), );
// Attach pendingIntent, so result is sent to App B instead of App A
authIntent.putExtra("resultReceiver", pendingIntent);

context.sendBroadcast(authIntent);

In these situations, due to improper binding or lack of strict checking in OS logic, the authentication result is sent to App B, not App A.

Where’s the Bug?

The vulnerability typically resides in system logic that doesn't correctly validate the origin and destination of authentication prompts and their results. That means any app can request the prompt and ask for the result, unless additional validation such as app package name or certificate fingerprint matching is done.

Potential Impact

- Local privilege escalation: Malicious apps can access features, data, or actions that would otherwise require explicit authentication by the user for a different (usually higher-privileged) app.
- Stealthy exploitation: Since user interaction is not needed, malware can silently elevate privileges or access accounts with little risk of user detection.
- Widespread risk: Affected logic may appear in multiple locations: Android system, OEM customizations, or shared components used across apps.

The (flawed) authentication system dispatches the prompt and its result as instructed by App B.

3. App B receives the authentication token/approval without App A knowing, and now can access stored passwords.

CVE Details page:

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-22422

Android Security Bulletin:

https://source.android.com/security/bulletin
- Example advisory by [Google/Project Zero] (hypothetical):
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2025/06/cve-2025-22422-authprompt-confusion.html

Android Open Source Project (AOSP) Issue Tracker:

https://issuetracker.google.com/issues?q=CVE-2025-22422

How to Mitigate

- System-level fix: Android and OEM vendors should patch authentication logic to strictly bind authentication requests and results to the originating application’s signature or process ID.

Always validate that authentication result events originate from expected trusted components.

- Avoid using generic broadcast/events for security-critical result handling; prefer explicit, tightly scoped communication.

Example App-Side Check

// In App A: Verify the origin of the result intent
@Override
public void onReceive(Context context, Intent intent) {
    String sender = intent.getStringExtra("origin_package");
    if (!isTrusted(sender)) {
        Log.d("Security", "Untrusted sender - ignoring!");
        return;
    }
    // Proceed with authentication result
}

Conclusion

CVE-2025-22422 is a sneaky, high-impact vulnerability arising from logic flaws in cross-app authentication flows. If authentication results can be claimed by the wrong recipient, local attacks become dangerously easy—without requiring any extra permissions or user clicks.

Update your systems, check your app logic, and stay vigilant for abuses of inter-app authentication!

*Written exclusively for this post: Please cite original sources where referenced, but this simplified breakdown and exploit mapping are original to this article.*

Timeline

Published on: 09/02/2025 23:15:33 UTC
Last modified on: 09/04/2025 16:39:34 UTC